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Abstract. Secret sharing is the well-known problem of splitting a se-
cret into multiple shares, which are distributed to shareholders. When
enough or the correct combination of shareholders work together the se-
cret can be restored. We introduce two new types of shares to the secret
sharing scheme of Shamir. Crucial shares are always needed for the re-
construction of the secret, whereas mutual redundant shares only help
once in reconstructing the secret. Further, we extend the idea of cru-
cial and redundant shares to a compartmented secret sharing scheme.
The scheme, which is based on Shamir’s, allows distributing the secret
to different compartments, that hold shareholders themselves. In each
compartment, another secret sharing scheme can be applied. Using the
modifications the overall complexity of general access structures realized
through compartmented secret sharing schemes can be reduced. This im-
proves the computational complexity. Also, the number of shares can be
reduced and some complex access structures can be realized with ideal
amount and size of shares.
Keywords: Secret Sharing · Compartmented Secret Sharing · General
Access · Ideal Secret Sharing · Crucial Shares · Redundant Shares
1 Introduction
A secret sharing scheme allows a dealer to distribute a secret, like an access code
to multiple users, often called shareholders. The parts of the secret, often called
shares or shadows can be used to reconstruct or reveal the secret when it is lost
or destroyed. A simple secret sharing scheme works as follows: First, the dealer
converts the secret into a number S from a Galois field modulo p. Second, it
generates a uniformly distributed random number ri from GF (p) for each but one
shareholder and calculates a r′, such that the equation S =
∑
i ri + r
′ mod p
holds. Third, it distributes each share ri or r
′ to the according shareholder.
When all shareholders work together they can calculate the sum of their shares
to reveal S. This allows distributing a secret in a way, such that no shareholder
can calculate S solely from their share. The secret cannot be revealed anymore if
any shareholder stops helping. Threshold secret sharing schemes overcome this
drawback.
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Threshold Secret Sharing Schemes
A (t, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme (TSSS) allows a dealer to define some
threshold t and to split a secret S, into n shares. The shares are distributed to
the shareholders. When the threshold is met, i.e. enough shareholders combine
their shares, they can reveal S. The following scenario can be solved by a TSSS:
Example 1. To open the vault of a company multiple people have to work to-
gether. The company owner, three managers, and three shift leaders each have a
private access code for the vault. As soon as two of the seven people enter their
code the vault can be opened.
Each of the n = 7 persons receives a single share, the threshold is t = 2.
Secret sharing schemes were first proposed in 1979 by Shamir [22] and Blakley [7].
In the scheme of Shamir a random polynomial of degree t − 1 is generated,
such that the intersection with the x-axis defines the secret. The polynomial
is used to calculate n points, which are distributed. When t points are known
the secret can be calculated. The scheme is discussed in detail in Section 2. In
the scheme of Blakley, the secret is a point of intersection of hyperplanes in a
t dimensional space. Other approaches, like [9] or [14] use Latin squares or the
Chinese Remainder Theorem.
Hierarchical Threshold Secret Sharing Schemes
Hierarchical threshold secret sharing schemes (HSSS), or multilevel threshold
schemes allow organizing shareholders in different groups. Each group is a sub-
group of a larger group, where the largest group contains all shareholders. This
allows replacing shares of a group by shares out of the parent groups. An HSSS
can solve the following scenario:
Example 2. To open the vault of a company multiple people have to work to-
gether. The company owner, three managers, and three shift leaders each have a
private access code for the vault. To open the vault all of the shift leaders have
to enter their private access codes. Because the owner and managers have higher
positions, their access codes can be used as substitutes for the codes of the shift
leaders. The vault can be opened for example if two of the managers, together
with a shift leader enter their codes, or if the owner, one manager, and one of
the shift leaders enter their codes.
Here, the first group consists of all the shift leaders. It is the only subgroup of
the group containing all persons. The threshold is t = 3.
Multiple approaches for HSSS are presented in [1, 11, 13, 23,24, 26, 28, 30].
Compartmented Secret Sharing Schemes
In compartmented secret sharing schemes (CTSS) the shareholders are grouped
in different compartments. Each compartment receives a share through a secret
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sharing scheme. Each share is used as a new secret and distributed, using another
secret sharing scheme to the users in the compartment. This allows to retrieve a
secret in a conjunctive CTSS if in every compartment the secret is retrieved, and
then the secrets are combined. In a disjunctive CTSS, only in a specific number
of compartments, the shares have to be revealed to calculate the secret. A CTSS
can solve the following scenario:
Example 3. To open the vault of a company multiple people have to work to-
gether. The company owner, three managers, and three shift leaders each have
a private access code for the vault. The company owner and the three managers
form the higher management, whereas the shift leaders form the lower manage-
ment.
In a conjunctive CTSS two people from the higher management and two people
from the lower management have to enter their codes to open the vault.
In a disjunctive CTSS, either two persons from the higher management, or two
persons from the lower management suffice to open the vault.
There are two compartments: Ch containing the persons from the higher man-
agement, with threshold th = 2. The other one Cl, with threshold tl = 2 contains
the persons from the lower management. The key for the vault is distributed two
both compartments, using a TSSS with threshold tc = 2 in the conjunctive case
and d = 1 in the disjunctive case. Both compartments distribute their share to
the shareholders using another TSSS.
It is possible to construct far more complex access structures, by using a CTSS.
In [5] it is shown, that every CTSS may be used for general access structures.
Shareholders might receive more than one share in those schemes. The approach
discussed in [19] can be used to generate both, HSSS and CTSS. Other ap-
proaches are presented in [12, 16, 24].
Weighted Threshold Secret Sharing Schemes
In a weighted threshold secret sharing schemes (WTSS) each shareholder has a
specific weight. If the sum of weights of the combined shares is larger than the
threshold value, the secret can be revealed. Single shares of shareholders with a
higher weight, therefore, can replace multiple shares of shareholders with lower
weights. A WTSS can solve the following scenario:
Example 4. To open the vault of a company multiple people have to work to-
gether. The company owner, three managers, and three shift leaders each have
a private access code for the vault. The company owner can open the vault on
his own, at least two of the managers can open the vault together, or two shift
leaders together with an additional manager can open the vault.
The threshold for this WTSS is t = 5. The personal access code of the company
owner has a weight of 5, the codes of the managers each have a weight of 3, the
access codes of the shift leaders each have a weight of 1. The combinations of
different weighted access codes give the described access structure.
Some WTSS are presented in [2, 3, 4, 17, 20, 21, 27].
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General Access Secret Sharing Schemes
The previous schemes were able to map specific access structures efficiently.
In [18], the multiple assignment scheme is proposed, where multiple shares are
assigned to each shareholder. With this approach, general access structures can
be realized, with the downside, that in the worst case a total of O(n · 2n) shares
have to be distributed to n shareholders. A general access secret sharing scheme
allows mapping every possible subgroup of shareholders into the access structure.
Multiple schemes, like those presented in [5,6,8,10,25] improve the efficiency by
reducing the number of shares or the size of each share.
Our contribution
Various scenarios can be mapped by using the displayed methods of secret shar-
ing. Still, there are some scenarios where either, the amount of distributed shares,
the computational complexity or the complexity of the secret sharing scheme can
be reduced, by introducing two special kinds of shares: Crucial shares are always
needed to reveal a secret, regardless of whether the threshold value is achieved,
or not. Redundant shares are pairs or sets of shares, where the first redundant
share helps in revealing the secret, but any additional redundant share does not
help any further. Our contribution consists of modifications to the secret sharing
scheme of Shamir, and the compartmented secret sharing scheme proposed by
Simmons [24], which is based on Shamir’s scheme. The modifications allow con-
structing general access schemes while many of the good properties of Shamir’s
scheme, like, easy implementation and high understandability can be retained.
In some cases even ideally can be achieved by using our modifications.
Exemplary Use-cases improved by our Modifications
The following examples show use-cases where our modifications to the TSSS of
Shamir and the CTSS of Simmons can help in creating schemes which are more
efficient than the state-of-the-art schemes.
Example 5. To open the vault of a company multiple people have to work to-
gether. The company owner (o), the head of security (sec), three managers
(m1, m2, m3), and three shift leaders (s1, s2, s3) each have a private access code
for the vault. Any combination of at least four codes can open the vault, but
in any case, the codes of the owner and the head of security have to be two of
them, and the remaining two codes cannot be both from shift leaders.
Example 5 can be mapped with our modified secret sharing scheme as follows:
the managers m1, m2, and m3 each receive a normal share from the dealer, the
shift leaders s1, s2, and s3 each receive a mutual redundant share, and both
the owner o and the head of security sec receive crucial shares. The threshold is
t = 2, the number of different shares is n = 4. By using a state-of-the-art scheme,
like the one presented in [10], more than 4 shares have to be distributed: the
disjunctive form describing the various group composition that allow to open
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the vault contains 12 different clauses like (o∧ sec∧m1∧m2), each containing 4
literals. For every clause a different (4, 4)-TSSS is used to determine the access.
Therefore, in total 48 shares have to be distributed. This can be reduced to 26
shares because o and sec are present in every clause. Therefore, o and sec receive
shares for a (2, 2)-scheme with secret S1. The 12 remaining clauses (m1 ∧ m2),
(m1 ∧ m3), (m2 ∧ m3), . . . are mapped by (2, 2)-TSSS, each having the same
secret S2. Access to the vault then is calculated through S1 + S2.
Example 6. To open the vault of a company multiple people have to work to-
gether. There are three managers and their deputies for three departments. The
staff in the departments can open the vault if there is a majority of staff in two
departments. Additionally, two department leaders, either manager or deputy
manager, of two different departments have to support them.
Example 6 can be mapped with our modified CTSS as follows: The three man-
agers and their deputies form a crucial compartment, where the secret is shared
in a (2, 3)-secret sharing. Each manager receives a normal share and the re-
spective deputy each receives a redundant share. Therefore, the secret in the
crucial compartment can be calculated if two managers, one manager, and an-
other department’s deputy or two deputies combine their shares. The staff of
each department i forms a compartment Ci, where each secret is the share of a
(2, 3)-secret sharing. The secret of a compartment Ci is distributed through a
(⌊ |Ci|2 ⌋+1, |Ci|)-secret sharing. This allows computing a compartments secret if
a majority of staff provides their shares. If two of the compartments provide their
shares, together with the crucial share the secret can be computed. Here, in total
6+|C1|+|C2|+|C3| shares, one for every person, have to be distributed. By using
state-of-the-art schemes, again a significantly higher number of shares have to be
distributed: in a department with |Ci| persons and a threshold of ti = ⌊
|Ci|
2 ⌋+1,
there can occur
(
|Ci|
ti
)
different combinations of persons. In Example 6 two out of
three such departments have to be calculated. In addition, there are 12 different
combinations of managers and deputies, which further increase the number of
secret sharing schemes needed to cover all possible combinations of persons that
can open the vault.
Organization of the Paper
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the backgrounds of secret
sharing schemes and explains the used schemes. In Section 3 our contributions
are described, Section 3.1 states the modifications to the threshold secret sharing
scheme of Shamir, whereas in Section 3.2 the modifications to compartmented
secret sharing schemes are discussed. Further, the implications for realizing gen-
eral access structures are shown. Finally, Section 4 concludes the work and gives
an outlook on future work.
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2 Secret Sharing Backgrounds
Definition 1 ((t, n)-Secret Sharing Scheme). A (t, n)-secret sharing scheme
allows a dealer to distribute n shares S = {S1, . . . , Sn} of a secret S, to the users
U = {U1, . . . , Un}. Any set A of shares, with |A| ≥ t can compute S.
Definition 2 (Access Structure). A family {A′ ⊆ A : A′ can reconstruct S}
in a secret sharing scheme with secret S and shares A is called access structure.
The schemes proposed by Shamir and Blakley are called threshold secret sharing
schemes because any subset of shares that reaches the threshold value can reveal
the secret. A general access secret sharing scheme allows constructing all access
structures.
Definition 3 (Perfect Secret Sharing Scheme). A secret sharing scheme is
called perfect, if no set A′ of shares allows learning anything about the secret, if
A′ is not in the access structure.
This means that correctly guessing the secret S with less than t shares in a
(t, n)-secret sharing scheme or any set of shares which is not part of the access
structure has the same probability as guessing S without a single share.
Definition 4 (Ideal Secret Sharing Scheme). A secret sharing scheme is
called ideal if it is perfect and the size of each shareholders share is in the same
domain as the secret.
Any scheme where a shareholder receives more than one share cannot be ideal.
In the following, we modify the secret sharing scheme of Shamir. This scheme
is well-known, easy to understand and to implement. The idea is to generate
a polynomial f(x) = S + a1 · x + a2 · x
2 + · · ·+ at−1 · x
t−1 mod p, where S is
the secret and the coefficients a1, a2, . . . at−1 are uniformly distributed random
variables, each from GF (p), the Galois field of order p. Each shareholder then
receives a point Si = f(xi). S can be computed by solving Equation System 1,
with at least t linearly independent combinations of xi and Si:
S + a1 · x1 + a2 · x
2
1 + · · ·+ at−1 · x
t−1
1 = S1 (mod p)
S + a1 · x2 + a2 · x
2
2 + · · ·+ at−1 · x
t−1
2 = S2 (mod p)
...
...
...
S + a1 · xn + a2 · x
2
n + · · ·+ at−1 · x
t−1
n = Sn (mod p)
(1)
Any set of t shareholders can obtain S. The secret sharing scheme of Shamir is
ideal [8]. For reconstruction, Equation System 1 can be used, but there are faster
reconstruction procedures. Using the Lagrange polynomial interpolation [29] the
secret can be computed if the shareholders Ui calculate the following sum:
S =
∑
i

Si ·
∏
i6=j
−xj
xi − xj
mod p

 (2)
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Lemma 1. Calculating shares in Shamir’s scheme is in O(t · n).
Proof. For generating shares t − 1 random variabes have to be chosen and the
polynomial f(x), of degree t−1, has to be evaluated. Using Horner’s method [15],
t − 1 multiplications are needed for a single share. Therefore, for computing n
shares t − 1 + n · (t − 1) < t + t · n calculations are needed. ⊓⊔
Lemma 2. Revealing S in Shamir’s secret sharing scheme is in O(t2).
Proof. A shareholder i has to calculate the product of the share Si and (t − 1)
times the given fraction. Therefore, t shareholders have to calculate t ·(t−1) < t2
products. ⊓⊔
Definition 5 (Compartmented Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme). In
a compartmented threshold secret sharing scheme with threshold t the users U
are partitioned into compartments C = {C1, . . . , Cm}, such that U =
⋃m
i=1 Ci.
The Secret S can be computed, if a set A of compartments, with |A| ≥ t combine
their shares. Each compartment Ci, can distribute the share Si in a (ti, |Ci|)-
secret sharing scheme to the |Ci| users.
In the following, the CTSS based on Shamir’s scheme, as proposed by Simmons
is used. In the scheme a secret S is divided into shares Si by generating a
polynomial f(x) and then calculating a point f(xi) for each compartment Ci.
In each compartment, then, another (t, n)-secret sharing scheme is applied. I.e.,
each share Si is a new secret inside the compartment, which is distributed to the
users hold by the compartment. To calculate the secret, in t compartments the
users have to combine their shares using the Lagrange polynomial interpolation
shown in Equation 2. With the t shares another polynomial interpolation has to
be calculated to find S.
3 Our Approach
In the following, some modifications to Shamir’s scheme are introduced. Later,
the respective modifications to the CTSS proposed by Simmons are discussed.
3.1 Secret Sharing
In Shamir’s secret sharing scheme each share has the same impact. Therefore, in
a (2, 4)-secret sharing scheme with the shares S1, S2, S3, and S4 all sets {Si, Sj},
with i 6= j can retrieve the secret. The following modification allows to restrict
the access group:
Definition 6 (Crucial Share). A share R is called crucial, if there exists no
set A′ of shares, with R /∈ A′, such that S can be computed.
By defining S1 as a crucial share the access group can be restricted to the
following: {{S1, S2}, {S1, S3}, {S1, S4}}.
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Lemma 3. Any number of crucial shares can be introduced to the secret shar-
ing scheme of Shamir, when S in the polynomial is replaced by some S′, with
S′ = S +
∑r
i=1 Ri mod p, and all Ri are drawn uniformly random from GF (p).
Proof. Finding the value S′ of the modified polynomial is the same as in Shamir’s
scheme. It can be found by using t linearly independent combinations of xi and
Si to solve the following equation system:
S′ + a1 · x1 + a2 · x
2
1 + · · ·+ at−1 · x
t−1
1 = S1 (mod p)
S′ + a1 · x2 + a2 · x
2
2 + · · ·+ at−1 · x
t−1
2 = S2 (mod p)
...
...
...
S′ + a1 · xn + a2 · x
2
n + · · ·+ at−1 · x
t−1
n = Sn (mod p)
Less than t linearly independent combinations results in an underconstrained
equation system. More than t combinations do not help in finding S, because
every Ri is independent. When S
′ is found S can be computed by subtracting all
crucial shares: S = S′ −
∑r
i=1 Ri mod p. If a crucial share C is missing only a
S′′ = S + C mod p, with C from GF (p) can be computed. Then, S can be any
number from GF (p). Therefore, all crucial shares are needed to calculate S ⊓⊔
Lemma 4. The modified secret sharing scheme with crucial shares remains per-
fect.
Proof. Calculating the secret S in the modified secret sharing scheme is the
combination of two problems. One problem is finding the value S′ for the poly-
nomial f ′(x) = S′ + a1 · x + a2 · x
2 + · · ·+ at−1 · x
t−1 mod p. Here, every set of
combinations of xi and Si, which is smaller than t, leads to infinitely many pos-
sible polynomials. The other problem is finding S from S′, which is moving the
correct polynomial vertically. Having more than t linearly independent combi-
nations of xi and Si does not help in computing S, because the crucial shares
Ri are independent of the points of the polynomial. Having less than r crucial
shares leaves the shareholders with some S′′ = S + C′ mod p, where C′ can be
any number from GF (p). Finding S by using S′′ in a meaningful way, therefore
is not possible. Guessing S from this point is as effective, as guessing it without
any knowledge. ⊓⊔
Lemma 5. The modified secret sharing scheme with crucial shares remains
ideal.
Proof. The modified scheme is perfect. Further, each value Ri is a uniformly
chosen random number out of GF (p). The resulting points, when evaluating the
polynomial remain in GF (p). Therefore all shares and the secret are from the
same domain. ⊓⊔
Another way of restricting the access group is by making shares less important
than others. In a (2, 4)-scheme with shares S1, S2, S3, and S4 the access group can
be reduced to {{S1, S3}, {S1, S4}, {S2, S3}, {S2, S4}} by not allowing to appear
S1 and S2, or S3 and S4 in the same set. This can be achieved by redundant
shares:
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Definition 7 (Redundant Share). Two shares R and Q, in a (t, n)-secret
sharing scheme, are called redundant, if there exists no set A′ of shares, with
R, Q ∈ A′ and |A′| = t, which can compute S.
The definitions for crucial shares and redundant shares can be modified to ap-
ply to shareholders instead of shares. But, as shareholders are allowed to hold
multiple shares, where the types of shares can be different, the definition may be
equivocal. For example, if a shareholder holds a crucial and a redundant share,
it can be confusing to call the shareholder crucial or redundant.
Lemma 6. Redundant shares can be introduced to the scheme of Shamir by
distributing the same share multiple times to different sharholders.
Proof. For finding S in Shamir’s scheme least t linearly independent combina-
tions of xi and Si are needed. Any set of s = t shares with at least two shares
j, k with xj = xk, Sj = Sk, and j 6= k has at most t − 1 linearly independent
shares. ⊓⊔
This allows introducing two or more redundant shares having the same value.
Multiple redundant shares with different values can be used in the modified
secret sharing scheme. We call any number of redundant shares corresponding
to the same value mutual redundant shares.
Lemma 7. The modified secret sharing scheme with redundant shares remains
perfect.
Proof. Redundant shares are copies of normal shares. Knowing multiple mutual
redundant shares results in the same amount of linearly independent pairs xi,
Si as having a single redundant share. ⊓⊔
Lemma 8. The modified secret sharing scheme with redundant shares remains
ideal.
Proof. Redundant shares are copies of normal shares, therefore they are out of
GF (p), as well as the secret S. ⊓⊔
Generating shares in the modified (t, n)-secret sharing scheme works similar
to Shamir’s scheme. At first the crucial shares Ri and coefficients ai are cho-
sen as uniformly distributed random numbers from GF (p). Then the modified
polynomial f ′(x) = S′ + a1x + a2x
2 + · · · + at−r−1x
t−r−1 mod p is generated,
where S′ = (S +
∑r
i=1 Ri) mod p. Each shareholder i of a normal share receive
a value corresponding to an evaluation of f ′(x) mod p, each shareholder i of a
crucial share receive the according Ri. Shareholders of redundant shares receive
a copy of the according evaluation of f ′(x) mod p. To calculate the secret from
shares Equation 3 has to be evaluated.
S =
∑
i

Si ·
∏
i6=j
−xj
xi − xj
mod p

−
r∑
k=1
Rk mod p (3)
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Lemma 9. Calculating shares in the modified scheme is in O(t · n).
Proof. r crucial shares and t − r − 1 coefficients ai have to be drawn because
each crucial share reduces the degree of the polynomial f ′(x) by one. A normal
share Si is calculated by evaluating f
′(x), which needs (t−r−1) multiplications
according to Horner’s method. Therefore, calculating (n− r − d) normal shares
and r crucial shares needs r + (t − r − 1) + (n − r − d) · (t − r − 1) < t + t · n
calculations. For any number of mutual redundant shares only one needs f ′(x)
to be calculated. All others are copied and do not need calculations. ⊓⊔
Lemma 10. Reconstruction of S in the modified scheme is in O(t2).
Proof. Each shareholder Ui contributing a normal share or a unique redundant
share has to calculate the product of the share Si and (t− r−1) times the given
fraction. Afterwards, the sum of crucial shares
∑r
k=1 Rr mod p is subtracted.
Therefore, the (t−r) shareholders with a normal share have to calculate in total
(t − r) · (t − r − 1) < t2 products, this equation holds because t ≥ r ≥ 0. ⊓⊔
The modified scheme allows using multiple crucial and redundant shares at the
same time. Therefore, the access structure can be more flexible. Crucial shares
in some way are a contradiction to the initial ideas behind secret sharing. Secret
sharing can be used to retrieve a secret which was lost or forgotten. The pos-
sibility to lose the secret increases again, when crucial shares are used, because
they can be lost, or shareholders might become malicious and stop helping in
revealing the secret.
3.2 Compartmented Secret Sharing
With modifications to compartmented threshold secret sharing schemes the
downside of using crucial shares can be offset, because similar to the previ-
ous chapter crucial compartments can be introduced, where a compartment is
on the one hand needed for the reconstruction of the secret, but on the other
hand multiple users help in reconstructing the share held by the compartment.
Therefore, the following definitions are similar to the ones of secret sharing.
Definition 8 (Crucial Compartment). A compartment R is called crucial,
if there exists no set A′ of shares of compartments, with R /∈ A′, such that S
can be computed.
Crucial compartments can be introduced to the scheme similar to the method
shown in Lemma 3, by replacing S with a S′ = S +
∑r
i=1 Ri mod p, where Ri
are the secrets of the crucial compartments. The secret sharing scheme inside
a crucial compartment is independent of the one used in the outer scheme.
Therefore, it can be another CTSS or a modified Shamir scheme.
Definition 9 (Redundant Compartment). Two compartments R and Q
are called redundant, if there exists no set A′ of shares of compartments, with
R, Q ∈ A′ and |A′| = t, which can compute S.
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Additionally, redundant compartments can be introduced. Similar to Lemma 6,
every redundant compartment receives the same secret, which leads to the case
that only one of the mutual redundant compartments can help in revealing the
secret. Again, the scheme inside the compartment is independent. Therefore,
every redundant compartment can use another secret sharing scheme, a different
number of shareholders, or different threshold values.
The computational complexity for the distribution of shares in the modified
scheme and for reconstructing the secret is again in the same bounds, as the
initial CTSS. Because as shown in Lemmas 9 and 10 sharing and reconstruction
in the non-compartmented scheme remain in the same bounds.
3.3 Feasible Access Structures and Ideality
Following the remarks of [5] it is possible to construct the compartments for a
CTSS to realize any access structure: Any formula in conjunctive normal form
(CNF) can be mapped. Consider two shareholders U1, U2 in a (2, 2)-secret shar-
ing scheme. Neither U1, nor U2 are sufficient to retrieve the secret on their own.
Therefore, the specific secret sharing scheme realizes the and operator. Whereas,
two shareholders U1, U2 in a (1, 2)-secret sharing scheme realize the or opera-
tor, because both can retrieve the secret on their own. Because both, the and
and the or operator are possible to map, any formula in CNF can be mapped.
The operators are not limited to be binary, but they can be n-ary. Consider the
following scenario: There are four users U1, U2, U3, and U4, which can retrieve
the secret if U1 with either U2 or U3 and one of U2, U4 work together. The for-
mula in CNF is (U1 ∧ (U2 ∨U3)∧ (U2 ∨U4)). The CTSS has three compartments
C1 = {U1}, C2 = {U2, U3}, and C3 = {U2, U4}, where C1 holds only a single
shareholder. The threshold is t = 3 in the outer scheme, and t = 1 in the inner
schemes. In the given example the shareholder U2 has to receive two independent
and possibly unequal shares.
Previously, each level in the CTSS either could work as an and or an or op-
erator. Now, by introducing the modifications to Shamir’s scheme and and or
operators can be used on the same level: Any crucial share R is needed to re-
trieve a secret, therefore it is introducing another and operator. Two mutual
redundant shares S and S′ do not help in revealing the secret. Therefore, re-
dundant shares introduce another kind of or operator. This or operator can be
especially useful whenever a structure in the form (A∧ (B ∨C)) appears, where
(B ∧C) should not be allowed. The previous example can be mapped as a mod-
ified (3, 4)-secret sharing scheme with U1 receiving a crucial share, U2 receiving
a normal share, and both U3 and U4 receiving the same redundant share. The
secret can be retrieved, if U1, U2, and one of U3 or U4 work together. In this
scheme every shareholder gets one single share, therefore it is ideal. Furthermore,
no CTSS is needed. This reduces both the computational complexity and the
total amount of shares.
Using crucial and redundant shares is not useful in every case. For example,
every secret sharing scheme, where only two shareholders participate can be
constructed without crucial and redundant shares: A scheme consisting solely of
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two redundant shares can be realized by a (1, 2)-secret sharing scheme. A scheme
consisting solely of two crucial shares can be realized by a (2, 2)-secret sharing
scheme, or by the much simpler method displayed in Section 1. A scheme con-
sisting of a crucial and a normal share can be mapped by a (2, 2)-secret sharing
scheme. In contrast, as soon as there are three shareholders the modifications
can be useful. Consider a scheme consisting of a crucial share R1, and two nor-
mal shares S1 and S2. The access structure is (R1 ∧ (S1 ∨ S2)). This scheme,
previously, could only be mapped by using a CTSS. Another example would
be a scheme consisting of a normal share S1 and two redundant shares S2 and
S′2. This scheme previously needed a compartmented scheme like in the example
before, because the access structure is (S1 ∧ (S2 ∨ S
′
2)).
The modifications cannot always help in constructing a scheme without compart-
ments. Consider the access structure from [5]: ((A ∧ B) ∨ (B ∧ C) ∨ (C ∧ D)).
None of the shares can be a crucial share, because no share is present in all
clauses. No pair of shares can be redundant: by making A and B redundant, the
clause (A ∧ B) = (A ∧ A) = (B ∧ B) would be unsatisfiable. By making A and
C redundant, the clause (A ∧D) = (C ∧D) would be implicitly introduced. By
making A and D redundant, a new clause (C∧A) = (C∧D) would be implicitly
introduced. Therefore no set of shares containing A can be redundant. Because
of symmetry, the same problems occurs for the other combinations of shares. The
given example, therefore, cannot be solved using the modified scheme without
compartments.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we present some modifications to the secret sharing scheme of
Shamir. The modifications allow defining redundant shares which give no addi-
tional advance in computing the secret if more than one mutual redundant shares
are used. Further, crucial shares can be defined which are essential for retrieving
the secret. We showed, that these modifications are easy to understand and im-
plement, that the resulting schemes still are ideal, and that the computational
complexity is not worse than in the original scheme. Further, the modifications
are introduced to the CTSS, as proposed by Simmons. The modifications can
help in constructing complex access structures, like for the scenarios described
in the Introduction, by reducing the complexity of the access structure. Further,
general access structures can be realized, where in some cases an optimal amount
of distributed shares of one per shareholder can be achieved, i.e. the resulting
scheme is ideal. In other cases, the computational complexity can be reduced
compared to the naive approach.
Further modifications could be to introduce other operators. Especially the xor
operator can be useful when trying to map access structures to a specific scheme
and help in reducing the amount of distributed shares. But not all operators
are always useful. Consider for example the nor operation, this would allow
constructing a scheme consisting of multiple shares, where the secret can be
calculated if no share is used. This is a contradiction to the initial idea be-
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hind secret sharing. Using compartmented secret sharing schemes clauses can
be mapped where all shares or a specific number of shares are needed to recon-
struct a secret. Introducing a random selector, where either the needed shares
for calculating the secret are randomly chosen or depending on which shares are
used to calculate the secret could be another modification to the scheme.
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